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Tobias Garcia Vega 
Saving Rawlsian Selfhood: Toward a Socio-historical Theory of Selves in John Rawls’ 
Theory of Justice 
 
Liberalism has long been the dominant theoretical tradition in political philosophy. Yet its status 
as such did not arise in a vacuum. Without the revision of concepts and the redrawing of 
distinctions, liberalism would be restricted to its earliest and most problematic formulations. The 
dialectic between liberalism and its critics, sympathizers and radicals alike, has not only brought 
the tradition itself into the modern era but preserved a specter of what liberalism once was. The 
specter, representing liberalism-past, hangs over liberals as well as those opposed to the tradition, 
albeit haunting them in different ways. The liberal must demonstrate that their liberalism is not 
that old one, or at least that it succeeds where previous iterations have failed. Many critics, 
however, fall into the trap of mistaking the specter of liberalism for the real thing. It is often the 
job of the liberal philosopher, then, to present their view while making clear where and how they 
depart from previous liberalisms.  
This is especially true of Rawlsian liberalism1. Many critics of Rawls present arguments 
against his intellectual tradition but not of Rawls himself. Although many arguments are aimed 
at Rawls, they often miss the mark. I say this not as an excuse to dismiss these critics – many 
develop critical insights that deserve more than a clarificatory rehearsal of Rawls’ political 
philosophy. In particular, the communitarian objection to Rawlsian contractarianism presented 
 
1 This thesis only considers Rawls’ earlier work: Rawls, “Justice as Fairness.” The Philosophical Review, vol. 
67, no. 2, 1958, pp. 164–194; "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory." The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 77, 




by Charles Taylor2 and the latest racial critique of Rawlsian liberalism advanced by Charles 
Mills3 are taken up here. Taylor argues that liberalism has been fatally individualistic; Mills, that 
liberalism has been “doubly” racialized in that it has been racialized epistemically among those 
who produce it and the concepts themselves, in theory and practice, are racialized.  
A synthesis of these critiques is in order as each requires more attention than they have 
received in isolation. By proposing a neo-Rawlsian account of selfhood that is sensitive to 
concerns of “non-ideal” social circumstance4 which have been largely ignored, this thesis aims to 
relieve the tension that has built up between Rawls’ critics and proponents of Rawlsian 
liberalism. Lived experience, a major theme arising in feminist philosophies; critical 
philosophies of race; and social philosophy generally, is marginalized in Rawls’ work on 
distributive justice. The effects material and social positions have on selfhood cannot be ignored. 
As such, these themes take center stage in this thesis.  
After summarizing “racial liberalism” in the first section, in the second section I argue 
that the social contract Rawls endorses is not racialized. However, as Mills demonstrates, the 
problem of the assumed whiteness of the contractors in the social contract scenario remains. 
Thus, I offer a response to the multiply problematized concept of Rawlsian selfhood. I argue that 
the Rawlsian conception of selfhood, responding to Taylor, need not be individualistic (section 
3) nor, responding to Mills, racialized or problematically insensitive to questions of race (section 
4). By addressing Taylor and Mills, steps will have been taken towards constructing a model of 
 
2 Taylor, "Atomism." Philosophical Papers: Volume 2, Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Cambridge  
UP, 1985, pp. 187-210.  
3 Primarily in Mills, Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism. Oxford UP, 2017. 
4 I take “non-ideal circumstance” to mean the very real systems of oppression we find ourselves in. That our society 
(speaking of the United States) is characterized by immense wealth and racial disparity, was built on exploited labor, 
whose gender, racial, but particularly class oppression is not only altogether abhorrent but has so deeply affected the 
tenor of interpersonal interaction (a salient feature of workplace discrimination and microaggressions). In general, I 
understand these components of “non-ideal circumstance”, in toto, as a given feature of the public and private 




selfhood sensitive to the elements of social life which I forward in section 5. In the final section, 
I demonstrate this model of selfhood is workable within a broader Rawlsian theory of justice. 
The neo-Rawlsian conception of selfhood this thesis endorses is largely inspired by the work of 
John Christman5. This thesis is intended to contribute to the project of further uniting themes 
important to feminist philosophy and philosophy of race with Rawlsian political philosophy.  
1 
WHAT IS RACIAL LIBERALISM? 
One would do well to begin by defining “liberalism”. There exists a vast literature 
surrounding how to interpret this term and which philosophers ought to be considered “liberal” 
in the sense of the term used in political theory as opposed to how the term is used in the current 
political climate in the US. In this thesis, I am mainly concerned with liberalism as it pertains to 
Rawls’ work. Although a broad-based attack on liberalism is forwarded by its critics and at 
various points, I adopt their language however I do so only in order to defend John Rawls’ work. 
In his newest book, Black Rights/White Wrongs, Charles Mills forwards a series of 
critiques against Rawls’ work. Mills claims that Rawls’ silence on matters of race and the 
Eurocentrism in his thought are not, as they have been understood, merely benign outcomes of 
the circumstances in which he was writing. He contends that these are the natural byproducts of 
adherence to a racial liberalism. Analogous to work by feminists concerning patriarchal 
liberalism6 and social theorists on bourgeois liberalism7, Mills' conception of racial liberalism is 
that, from the start, liberalism has had an implicit racial component which affects all levels of 
 
5 John Christman, The Politics of Persons: Individual Autonomy and Socio-historical Selves. Cambridge UP, 
(2009).  
6 Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (1988) 




theorization. According to Mills, defining racial liberalism in part uncovers its corrosive effect 
on theories expounded by self-identifying liberals. He notes:  
Liberalism, I suggest, has historically been predominantly a racial liberalism, in which conceptions of 
personhood and resulting schedules of rights, duties, and government responsibilities have all been 
racialized. And the contract, correspondingly, has really been a racial one, an agreement among white 
contractors to subordinate and exploit nonwhite non-contractors for white benefit. Insofar as moral debate 
in contemporary political theory ignores this history, it will only serve to perpetuate it. (Mills 2017, 29)  
Mills contends that the effects of racism, whether intentional or implicit, are threefold. First, 
liberalism, at the level of personhood (and all talk of rights, duties, etc.), imports a non-raced, or 
implicitly “white”, conception of personhood as the model to which all raced or non-white 
individuals are expected to assimilate. Second, at the level of the social contract, both in theory 
and in practice, liberalism is said to reify the image of political reality where white contractors 
convene in order to subjugate non-white non-contractors yet simultaneously obfuscating this 
image with purportedly race-neutral talk of leaving the state of nature. Finally, Mills believes it 
is an imperative to give questions of race center stage in moral and political theorizing. 
Otherwise, philosophers risk implicitly perpetuating racist constructs which threaten to 
continually poison discourse at all levels8. An object of this thesis will be to demonstrate how 
Rawlsian philosophy may be freed from the critique of racial liberalism as presented above.  
Moreover, while I tend to agree with Mills’ condemnation of liberalism as a critique of 
classical political philosophy, I disagree with his suggestion that race should always be the 
central focus of ethico-political philosophical discourse and investigation. The academic circles 
Mills was addressing when he made these arguments, owing to the relative general silence on 
 
8 Of course, this last point only applies to the group of racially and class-privileged theorists who would otherwise 
only involve themselves in canonical political theory; engage in “post-race” discourse; or bracket questions of race, 




race, understood concepts like “white supremacy” in a much more benign form than the way it is 
understood now that white supremacy has become an active motivating force for countless hate 
crimes in the West. And so, it is only natural that philosophers who once believed the Obama-era 
was a sign of the “post-race” society to come are now more skeptical of that image and have 
become more aware of the complexities of race relations in the United States. In part, this 
audience has become more willing to theorize about issues relating to race as it has become such 
a debated topic in public culture.  
However, while I believe this latest resurgence of white supremacy and white nationalism 
are important objects of inquiry because they force political philosophers to consider pressing 
issues for social justice, there are nevertheless many concepts in political philosophy that are 
analytically distinct from concepts of race although they may appear in this new political arena 
of anti-racist efforts and militant right-wing resistance. Thus, I reject the notion that silence on 
race is enough to criticize Rawls’ work wholesale. One would think that Mills’ critique is an 
open letter to political and moral theorists currently publishing with the intent to spur on new 
discourse on matters of race where it would otherwise be lacking. But in the latter half of Black 
Rights/White Wrongs, Mills directs most of his attention to a detailed critique of Rawls’ 
contractarianism, his broader political views and, as Mills contends, Rawls’ white ignorance. 
Mills condemns Rawls for having remained silent on these issues, implicating Rawls’ whiteness 
as an inherent flaw to his arguments. While I advocate for the inclusion of historical domination 
in normative theorizing, especially in section 5, I reject Mills’ direct critique of Rawls regarding 
his supposed white ignorance (as he did not exclude the possibility of an anti-racist liberalism 
and was involved with anti-racist efforts himself9). While the positive account worked out in 
 
9 Stanley Cavell in his autobiographical diary recounts drafting voting rights legislation with fellow professor John 




section 5 of this thesis remains sensitive to elements of “non-ideal” circumstance, in general I 
avoid personalized critiques of theorists for not offering an exhaustive analysis of the context in 
which their normative arguments operate.  
2 
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IS NOT RACIAL 
In this section, I attempt to defend the Rawlsian social contract from Charles Mills. His central 
argument against the social contract, like his global critique of liberalism, is that it has been 
white-washed and perpetuates an unduly sanitized history. The social contract is fundamental to 
Theory, Rawls himself says that the “main idea of the theory of justice” is to “present a 
conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar 
theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant” (2009, p. 10). 
Moreover, both Rawls and Kant’s social contract theories, as Mills argues, are linked to their 
philosophical anthropology and conceptions of selfhood. Thus, a defense of Rawlsian selfhood 
from Mills’ racial critique requires at least a preliminary defense of the social contract. One 
could imagine a web extending from a common point. To defend the Rawlsian conception of 
selfhood, at the outer reaches of the web, depends on the integrity of the social contract, 
represented by the center.  
Mills’ argument against the social contract is thus intimately related to his critique of 
liberal selfhood. For the purposes of this section, I focus on three arguments as they pertain to 
the social contract. Firstly, Mills argues that the social contract is both committed to and 
reproduces distorted images of socio-political reality. He believes normative guidance offered by 
the contract is adequate only if the implicit distorted view of society is rejected in favor of an 




the sanitized version of reality, i.e. normalizes an initial situation of presumed social equality, to 
the exclusion of discussions concerning lived oppression. Third, Mills personalizes the argument 
that Rawls is silent on matters of race by arguing that this silence is a natural consequence of 
Rawls’ white racial ignorance and emblematic of academic political philosophy at large. By 
responding to each of these points, I believe I will have weakened the need for Mills’ proposed 
alternative “domination contract”10.  
2.1 Social Contract as History? 
The first of Charles Mills’ central theses is that the social contract tradition is, minimally, 
committed to a distorted picture of reality and, in the strongest formulation of his critique, the 
entire edifice itself is a descriptive account of social relations. Mills defends the former when he 
talks of the normalization of justice by mainstream academic political philosophy11. Arguing for 
the latter, he notes, “the [social] contract […] has really been a racial one, an agreement among 
white contractors to subordinate and exploit nonwhite non-contractors for white benefit” (Mills 
2017, §3). Furthermore, Mills characterizes the contract heuristic itself as centered around the 
idea that there is both a descriptive and normative claim made by the contract. 
In defense of Rawls’ contract method, I offer two deflationary responses to Mills. First, I 
suggest Mills conflates two distinct aims that a social contract can have. The social contract is 
generally understood as a normative and binding, yet hypothetical, document. However, it can 
also be interpreted, as Mills does, as a “descriptive” document. A descriptive social contract 
concerns the real conditions in, and reasons for, which modern democratic societies were 
initially formed; a normative account attempts to bring about the conditions necessary for the 
creation of a fully just and sustainable society. I summarize this distinction by calling the former 
 
10 His proposed a replacement for the traditional “social contract”. 




a “descriptive contract” and the latter a “normative contract”12. I argue that acceptable social 
contract theories are not framed as descriptive accounts of reality. Unless the social contract is 
understood normatively, it is open to the classic intuitive objection that it misrepresents history. 
Mills in BR/WR (and 1998, 2014, 2017 RC) presents the short argument that all social contract 
theories are both descriptive and normative as he describes Rawls’ Eurocentrism:  
Moreover, [Rawls] does so within a (sanitized) European conceptual apparatus, ethnically cleansed of its 
actual discursive history of ethnic cleansing. (And this, to repeat is why though Rawls’ contract is 
hypothetical and normative rather than descriptive, the factual critique is still relevant, since the factual 
picture presupposed shapes the orientation of the normative inquiry and the concepts deemed appropriate 
for it.) (Mills 2017, 151 emphasis added) 
His claim is not so much that social contract theorists explicitly believed their theories operated 
on a normative and descriptive level, but rather that their implicitly whitewashed image of reality 
which serves as the foundation of their normative accounts, can only result in normative 
principles which do not adequately address problems of race.  
Thus, the idealized (normative) contract, Mills contends, is misleading if it does not 
present an accurate “factual picture” of reality – in this case, one riddled with global white 
domination and a history of pervasive ethnic cleansing. A valid social contract, for Mills, must 
countenance the real historical context in which it was formed as well as provide the necessary 
guidance towards an ideal society. Of course, the problem does not arise unless one has already 
 
12 Mills provides several other distinctions between kinds of ideal theorizing in his 2004 essay “Ideal Theory as 
Ideology”. The harmfulness of theory is determined by the object or purpose of abstraction with “idealization” as the 
worst kind since it actively represents “the actual” as “the ideal”. For the purpose of this thesis and Mills’ alternative 
social contract, it is only necessary to keep ideal theory in the above sense (although I do not accept Mills’ 
teleological definition of ideal theory) and its polar opposite “non-ideal theory” in mind. It should also be noted that 
this is “non-ideal” theory to the exclusion of ideal theory since Mills conceives of his project as entirely devoid of 
any idealized or abstracted method. As Mills believes these are mutually exclusive methods and identifies John 
Rawls’ work as the quintessential work within ideal theory, ideal and non-ideal theory are the only two methods 




accepted that the social contract is intended to operate as a hybrid descriptive-normative contract 
in the way Mills suggests.  
An example of a faulty presupposed “factual picture”, Mills suggests, is Rawls’ definition 
of society as “a cooperative venture for mutual advantage” (Rawls 1999, 4). Mills believes this is 
a distorted representation of the social reality which characterized the creation of real societies in 
the West. He believes all social contracts (which were actually carried out, even by symbolic acts 
like the gathering of the United States’ Framers) are descriptive at some level. As evidence of 
this point, Mills points to how the historical context which defined the drafting of the United 
States Constitution reveals a vast amount of class and racial privilege enjoyed by the Framers, 
coloring talk of egalitarian ideals.  
In addition, Mills presumes Rawls is consciously giving a realistic account of society as 
Mills points out the incongruence between Rawls’ (idealized) definition of “society” and our 
own societies, categorizing this clear difference as a fault inherent to Rawls’ account. Mills 
refuses to interpret Rawls as offering merely an account of what society as a social ideal would 
be. Rather, Mills argues that by not giving a descriptive account of political reality one “tacit[ly] 
represent[s]…the actual” (2017 §3). Since Rawls, or Rawlsians, do not depict a non-ideal 
(actual) society, Mills contends they recreate a distorted picture of our actual world by instead 
describing the ideal.  
Rawls is therefore said to be reproducing distorted factual pictures when he characterizes 
society as a “cooperative venture…” (Ibid). However, Rawls’ definition of “society” was not 
intended as the basis of his theory, and especially not for a descriptive social contract theory. Put 
simply, Rawls gives a brief definition of society intended as an innocuous preliminary definition 




incongruence between the innocuous definition Rawls uses on the fourth page of his work and 
the socioeconomic conditions which characterized a republic like the United States is an 
inadequate response if intended as a critique of Rawls’ overall project. This mischaracterization 
of Rawls carries itself into Mills’ representation of the normative social contract. As Rawls 
presents it (Rawls 2009, §4), the social contract is a hypothetical scenario for the construction of 
normative principles of justice. Therefore, Mills’ assertion that the normative social contract fails 
to describe the social conditions in which the United States “contract” came about is a category 
error and borders on reifying the intuitive critique that “there was never a social contract” as a 
genuine one thus legitimizing a structural reorientation of the entire purpose of the social 
contract.  
It is in this light that Mills proposes a domination contract (2014), whose envisioned 
scenario aims at more accurately representing our own, i.e. one where a group of white 
contractors consciously subordinate all nonwhites. However, this alternative gives an equally 
distorted picture of reality and needlessly makes the defunct historical critique of the social 
contract a genuine one. It is a dubious psychological claim to make that, worldwide, contractors 
(that is, those “signing” the “social contract” into existence) are explicitly agreeing to 
subordinate nonwhites with the creation of the contract. Though Mills’ domination contract more 
accurately depicts the illiberalism which has characterized global history, it is nevertheless the 
case that concerns remain in regard to its use as an alternative normative doctrine. Social contract 
theory loses any real normativity if its aim is both descriptive and normative. Knowing what 
justice, in an idealized and timeless sense, requires of individuals and institutions is important 
knowledge not only for members of the envisioned just society (i.e. abstract hypothetical 




philosophical methodologies but, to preview my response to Mills’ next argument, focus on one 
method of inquiry does not preclude the practice of another.  
2.2 The Normalization of Justice 
Second, to respond to the normalization of justice in political theory supposedly caused 
by the “sanitized” history of the social contract. It is true that political philosophers spend a lot of 
time theorizing about justice, and what it conceptually requires of us. This hyper-focus on 
justice, as the critique goes, in fact normalizes it in our discourse so that philosophers begin to 
speak as if real life injustices do not matter. From there, it is essentially a conceptual slippery 
slope until philosophers start to believe injustices do not exist13.  
This point is more an outcome of Mills’ descriptive-normative14 conflation. Philosophers 
do indeed spend a lot of time talking about justice; however, they are concerned with normative 
justice and not always corrective justice. What separates the two is that one isolates what justice 
is conceptually while the other presupposes some injustice to have occurred at some time in the 
past and attempts to have it corrected. Correspondingly, the social contracts spoken of are 
normative and not meant to be historically accurate real documents. Rawls speaks of the 
limitations of the contract as a history, but says it nevertheless is an important heuristic that 
ensures a situation of fairness when deciding on the principles of justice. As he notes, “[t]hus 
however mistaken the notion of the social contract may be as history, and however far it may 
overreach itself as a general theory of social and political obligation, it does express, suitably 
interpreted, an essential part of the conception of justice” (1971 pp. 192 – 193).  
 
13 In fact, Mills employs this exact argument in his talk of the “conceptual slippage” as what must have caused 
political philosophy’s supposed blindness to injustices. 
14 This (“descriptive-normative”) is how I summarize Mills’ claim that the social contract is a hybrid normative 
action-guiding and realist descriptive or historical apparatus. Such a contract would characterize political reality here 
and now while provide action-guiding moral imperatives. I call it a conflation since this is ultimately a 




 However, Mills makes a broader point here: all inquiry concerning justice as a concept, 
or virtue, over many decades has resulted in a theoretical tipping of the scales towards justice. 
His critique extends past the social contract, but for now I only give a critique of his point insofar 
as the social contract normalizes justice. As that is more directly a global critique of Rawls’ 
method, I give that critique a fuller and more philosophically grounded response in section 4. At 
present, and to draw out the response I hinted at in the last paragraph, it should be noted that a 
top-down15 approach (constructing a theory of justice within “ideal theory” and then moving to 
do more pragmatic work against the injustices which characterize our actual, “non-ideal” world), 
like the one Rawls advocates, can provide the exactitude necessary for measures of corrective 
justice to themselves be just and applied in a consistent, coherent manner. To reach normative 
principles solely from an understanding of the “non-ideal”, i.e. a bottom-up approach, either 
itself requires a conception of the ideal (i.e. a theory of justice), is inexact in that it can only 
orient us in the direction of a nebulous ideal, or is utophobic in that it requires us to bring about 
“realistic” justice (i.e. justice achievable given the current material conditions and societal 
structure). Oppression, inequity, marginalization all require for their correction a theory of 
normative justice in the other direction. In this vein, ideal and non-ideal theory are less methods 
locked in diametric opposition and more a symbiotic whole where one requires the other. After 
all, as Mills says of various contractarian positions, “the contract is best thought of as a device 
that can be put to multiple uses, rather than as an apparatus that prescribes a particular social 
template” (Mills 2017 RC, p. 2).” I believe this same reasoning was behind Rawls’ decision to 
 
15 This language is intended in a value-neutral way. I only mean to glom onto the existing language in the literature 
regarding “non-ideal” and “ideal” theory and the general understanding that Rawls encourages we engage in 
idealized theory before turning to address specific non-ideal concerns. Top-down and bottom-up can help visualize 
what I believe to be an analogue to the methodological aspects of the debate between Platonic forms, or Universals, 




give a normative (or prescriptive) account of justice suitable for countless actual societies rather 
than offer an attenuated conception of corrective justice adequate only for specific patterns of 
historical injustice, racial other otherwise. However, he did not deny the importance of corrective 
justice. Which leads to the final point on racial ignorance.  
2.3 Silence on Oppression 
Rawls’ silence on historical injustice is less harmful than how Mills would otherwise 
describe it when he says, “[i]nsofar as moral debate in contemporary political theory ignores this 
history, it will only serve to perpetuate it” (Mills 2017, §3). Distinct from other social contract 
theorists, Rawls posits a contractarian framework applicable to a society which meets the 
circumstances of justice, i.e. one that already has a scheme of social practices in play and has 
established a basic structure which together partially fulfill “the normal conditions under which 
human cooperation is both possible and necessary” (2009 p.109). The principles of justice are 
thus intended to regulate both the institutional and the social domain16. It is therefore much less 
obvious that Rawls is a purely atomistic philosopher who represents selves as detached from 
their social, political, and historical context. In fact, he argues, even if implicitly, that the self is 
largely a social product. Conceptions of the good, basic interests and desires are influenced by 
social practices and the basic structure. The influence can even be to the detriment of certain 
views, although this would not occur in the just society.  
Rawls does not assume that these circumstances, the basic structure, or social practices 
before the construction of the principles of justice are themselves just. The Rawlsian 
circumstances of justice roughly describe our own modern reality, one made up of social 
practices, a certain economic distribution, and a collection of institutions regardless of any value-
 
16 Although they are intimately linked, one often benefits from the other, their separation for conceptual isolation is 




judgment of how these elements may have historically arisen or currently operate. It is not as if 
the Rawlsian social contract was intended to explicate historical injustices, it was to give 
conceptual clarity to justice itself as an ideal independent from any one social arrangement, just 
or unjust.  
Furthermore, in the construction of principles of justice to regulate society’s social 
practices and basic institutions, conceptions of the good which are internally incoherent or aim to 
explicitly subordinate social groups or individuals are summarily rejected and thus their 
influence in the selection of principles of justice is nullified. This is demonstrated when Rawls 
distinguishes his contractarian view, Justice as Fairness, from utilitarianism and argues that:  
In justice as fairness, on the other hand, persons accept in advance a principle of equal liberty and they do 
this without a knowledge of their more particular ends. They implicitly agree, therefore, to conform their 
conceptions of their good to what the principles of justice require, or at least not to press claims which 
directly violate them. An individual who finds that he enjoys seeing others in positions of lesser liberty 
understands that he has no claim whatever to this enjoyment. (Rawls 1999, p. 27) 
Thus, an allowable range of conceptions of the good is established which precludes the use of 
white supremacist/racist, sexist, or any other discriminatory worldview in the process of 
deliberating between principles of justice. Of course, Rawls himself does not rule out the use of 
white supremacist conceptions of the good, but I argue that these worldviews require 
“enjoyment” in some sense that others are made to occupy a much lower social standing and 
would thus be ruled out by all reasonable interpretations of Rawls. Thus it is one thing to charge 
Rawls with racial ignorance, but the restrictions Rawls placed against odious conceptions of the 
good stands on its own and as such, to claim Rawls is blatantly racially ignorant is an ineffective 
appraisal of Rawls’ work. While Rawls’ project was to disallow such conceptions and although 




ethnic, or class oppression, this criticism is legitimate only when applied to the vast post-
Rawlsian literature and not when viewed as a flaw inherent to the Rawlsian theory of justice.  
3 
RAWLSIAN SELFHOOD IS NOT RADICALLY INDIVIDUALISTIC 
But what of the “contractors” themselves in the contract argument Rawls offers? It is generally 
(mis)understood that they are represented individualistically as I now demonstrate.  
The novel claim in Charles Taylor’s important essay Atomism (1985), that liberal 
philosophy has altogether failed to recognize its detrimental attachment to radical individualism, 
personifies this misconstrual. He argues that any viable theory of justice must first recognize the 
importance of a society, the interpersonal relations that occur within it, and the social practices 
that define it. These are all important, he argues, since they develop the fundamentally human 
capacities that moral theorists falsely take as their theoretical starting point. By Taylor’s logic it 
is a mistake to think autonomy has any value outside of a polis.  
Taylor’s Atomism does more than point to the assumed individualism of liberal 
philosophy, now a classic tool in the arsenal of those who oppose liberalism. Taylor’s argument 
attempts to show a circularity inherent to liberal reasoning. Taylor maintains that philosophers 
have all too often asserted that rights, especially freedom17, enjoy primacy over all other 
theoretical commitments. Rights and immunities, however, require an underlying distinctly 
human capacity so that a declaration about the importance of rights has as its scope all humans 
(though some include animals). Thus, there must be an additional commitment to the 
development of these capacities, otherwise the cognitive function necessary for general human 
enjoyment of those rights is unsupported. The capacities themselves must be developed, 
 




otherwise they are never actualized and the rights which depend on them cannot be enjoyed by 
the morally relevant beings.  
To support theses blind to this fact, i.e. ones that advance the importance of rights in 
isolation, is to make an unintelligible claim about selfhood since, for Taylor, “our identity is 
always partly defined in conversation with others or through the common understanding which 
underlies the practices of our society” (1985, p. 209). A key example is the right to freedom of 
choice. As a capacity, it relies on interpersonal dialogue as well as social institutions for its 
development and sustenance. Thus, “the identity of the autonomous self-determining individual 
requires a social matrix (one for instance which, through a series of practices, recognizes the 
right to autonomous decision and which calls for the individual having a voice in deliberation 
about public action)” (Ibid, p. 209). Theses representing freedom as enjoying primacy over other 
competing “social theses”18, only communicate half the story. Liberals often support theses of 
rights (like Rawls’ first principle of justice) only after presupposing that they have worth outside 
of the social contexts in which they function and in so doing, Taylor believes liberal philosophers 
contradict themselves since rights in fact depend on a social matrix for their development. 
According to Taylor, liberals make these and similar assertions to the detriment of theses 
emphasizing commitments to society. The putative individualists make the faulty claim that 
societies only bear instrumental value. Anyone who holds this premise in turn must understand 
society as valuable only as the protectorate of the freedom to choose; societies are important for 
a theory of justice insofar as they stop rights of the individual from being trampled. Not only 
does this depreciate society’s intrinsic value, Taylor argues that such claims rely on an equally 
contentious premise that rights are detachable from human capacities. Before one even argues for 
 




the importance of the rights of an autonomous individual and consequently deemphasizes the 
role of society to being only intrinsically valuable, there is an implicit premise which severs 
rights from all social context. In fact, as Taylor argues, autonomy itself (arguably the most 
important right for many political philosophers) is a capacity that requires a social matrix for its 
development. Thus, if philosophers implicitly deny the importance of a place in a social matrix 
for individuals, then they deny a component essential to the very notion of freedom. This in fact 
worsens the standard liberal contradiction for Taylor since such philosophers first assert that 
agents have a schedule of human rights, which itself secures the freedom to choose between 
competing plans of life. Not only does this value rights outside of their natural context but it also 
inverts the causal relation between human capacities and rights. In this instance, the causal order 
represents rights as that which secures autonomy rather than autonomy and the social context as 
that which develops the capacities necessary to fully “secure” rights in theory. 
Taylor presents this argument as an explicit a rejection of John Locke and Robert Nozick, 
but only indirectly as a critique of Rawls. Nevertheless, all three play the role opposite Taylor’s 
in the dialectic he constructs in Atomism. Importantly for followers of Rawls, autonomy plays a 
crucial role in his description of the original position as he argues that a formal condition for 
rationality is the ability to construct and see out a plan of life, often shortening this view with the 
expression as having a “rational plan of life” (Rawls 2009, §63).  
Taylor argues that Rawls’ focus on the construction of a plan of life as a condition of 
rationality commits the liberal error by wrongfully downplaying the role of the social matrix in 
developing that persons’ choice (1985, p.205). Conceiving of the individual as made up of a 
schedule of abilities desirable for a hypothetical situation of choice has had a toxic influence on 




the social elements which are required for its development. To Taylor, in order to ensure human 
flourishing, principles which recognize the importance of social practices and institutions are 
more important as those which protect the autonomy of the individual. The construction of a life-
plan, for Taylor, is never truly formulated devoid of a social matrix of shared practices, and the 
idea that they can be constructed without one is a social fiction. 
However, although Taylor’s argument succeeds as a critique of western individualism, it 
fails as a critique of Rawls. Will Kymlicka argues that Rawls carefully lays out the importance of 
a social basis of self-respect and of other social preconditions for the construction of rational 
plans for life (Kymlicka 1991, p.62). Kymlicka shows that the communitarian critiques, insofar 
as they are aimed at the Rawlsian vocabulary, are ineffectual. First, one need only look to Rawls’ 
explicit recognition of the social basis of self-respect as a crucial component for the development 
of the liberal (autonomous, free choosing) self and more importantly its capacities (Ibid, p. 61; 
Rawls 2009, §67). 
self-respect implies a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s 
intentions. When we feel that our plans are of little value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure or take 
delight in their execution. Nor plagued by failure and self-doubt can we continue in our endeavors. It is 
clear then why self-respect is a primary good. Without it nothing may seem worth doing, or if some things 
have value for us, we lack the will to strive for them. All desire and activity becomes empty and vain, and 
we sink into apathy and cynicism. Therefore the parties in the original position would wish to avoid at 
almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect. The fact that justice as fairness gives 
more support to self-esteem than other principles is a strong reason for them to adopt it. (2009, p. 386) 
Goods lose worth, insofar as they are to be used in a rational plan of life, if there lacks self-
respect among the members of polity. Second, though Rawls may not explicitly state that 
autonomy is a capacity, he understood that a social matrix (the basic structure, social practices, 




us. These institutions and practices are what must provide respect for the conception of the good 
held by the members of the polity. Only then can a person’s conception of the good serve as the 
regulative foundation from which to advance claims in the original position.  
As such, life plans are not constructed “de novo”, i.e. Rawls does not forward the value 
of autonomy outside of its social context, as Taylor suggests (1985 p. 210) since a social pretext 
exists and supports the understanding amongst its members that their life plans have worth. 
Fundamental to Rawlsian recognition is the fact that one must be seen – by society’s institutions, 
practices and other individuals – as a self-authenticating source of worthwhile life plans. As 
Rawls states: 
We may define self-respect (or self-esteem) as having two aspects. First of all, as we noted earlier (§29), it 
includes a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of 
life, is worth carrying out. And second, self-respect implies a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is 
within one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions. (2009, p. 386) 
Negatively, if there were a lack of respect for a certain life plan because it is not valued, then it 
would be nigh on impossible to construct a life plan which oriented around that end. This life, in 
the eyes of the agent, would simply not appear to be worth actualizing. As the Taylorian logic 
goes, the demand to be freely self-determining “cannot specify any content to our action outside 
of a situation which sets goals for us, which thus imparts a shape to rationality and provides an 
inspiration for creativity” (1975, p. 157). Some philosophers like Kymlicka have offered a 
broadly metaphysical defense of a Rawlsian theory of justice that requires a self which is before 
its valued ends and attachments in order for those ends to be appraised and located within a life 
plan. Speculative metaphysical discussion ensues as Rawlsian liberals have defended the 
possibility that the self, understood metaphysically, is separable from the elements of social life 




etc.) which strong versions of communitarianism claim are, by contrast, inseparable from the 
self. Kymlicka argues that through entertaining counterfactual scenarios, the liberal self is always 
detachable from its social context and can always appraise whether certain attachments are worth 
maintaining or certain goals worth pursuing. Crucially for Rawls, he does not forward a rigid 
conception of the good which defines the acceptable goals or commitments that may arise in 
one’s life plan, instead Rawls remains procedurally neutral among conceptions of what 
constitutes “the good life”. This means that, apart from any speculative metaphysics, Rawls’ 
theory of justice does not presuppose a conception of the good and in turn impose it on the 
members of a polity. Neither is it argued that the social context which supports the self 
determines conception of the good or set some range of desirable goals in which goals are set.  
In addition, although a priority problem between a thesis about rights and a thesis about a 
social “situation” has been demonstrated to be a failed characterization of Rawlsian liberalism. 
But liberalism is nevertheless critiqued as fatally individualistic, albeit in ways that are distinct 
from Taylor’s logic since he suggests liberalism individualism is a result of theoretical priority.  
Which brings us to the second way in which the critique of individualism is formulated: 
critiquing Rawls’ reliance on the Kantian conception of autonomy. By this criticism, liberal 
individualism arose due to its theoretical attachments rather than by an explicit argument 
endorsing individualism. In Rawls’ case, his work is critiqued via an adherence to Kant. As I 
now argue, the theory of selfhood in Rawls’ Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory (1980), is 
not subject to the critique of radically atomistic individuality. However, the Kantian view 
requires modification so that it may address critiques by social philosophers more generally.  
To briefly offer some background, Rawls follows Kant by locating equal moral worth 




original position as rational (idealized) autonomy. To bring everyday autonomy to a higher level 
of abstraction, Rawls suggests rational autonomy, a “rather limited conception”, requires only 
the minimal thesis that each person be viewed by other beings as “entitled to make claims on the 
design of their common institutions in the name of their own fundamental aims and highest-order 
interests” whatever those may turn out to be (Ibid, p. 521). The original position models 
individual capacities and isolates them in a scenario and thus secures both freedom and fairness 
when those hypothetical persons adjudicate between principles of justice and seek to protect their 
plans of life. Put roughly, this can only be achieved when persons are “ends in themselves”.  
Now, as communitarians and some egalitarians might argue, the ideal of equality instead 
requires that social groups, defined in any number of ways and depending on the social context 
in which they are formed, ought to take center stage as opposed to ceding moral worth entirely to 
the atomized individual. According to this critique, if protecting autonomy precludes recognition 
of the important commitments to others (to social groups, identities, religions, and collectivities 
etc.), then so much the worse for an autonomy-based theory of justice, i.e. so much the worse for 
Rawlsian liberalism.  
Yet there is a reason Rawls points to the basic structure of society as the subject of 
justice. He does so, as he argued, “because its effects are so profound and present from the start” 
(2009, p. 7). As mentioned above, one of the ways we are socially constructed is by the influence 
which self-respect, or the lack thereof, can have on the construction of our rational plans of life 
(2009 §67). People’s desires, valued ends, and the possibilities in life as well as the way they 
adjudicate between them is social mediated through many aspects of the public and private 
culture of a modern democratic society. Rawls in his earlier work Justice as Fairness (1958) 




the subject of justice. This highlights the many ways in which our desires and interests are 
fundamentally shaped by social practices as well as the many public institutions (Ibid, p. 169) of 
the society we live in. Taking the autonomy of persons, in a Rawlsian sense, seriously means the 
principles of justice must regulate the social and institutional influences that bear on the self as 
any deviation from treatment as such is unjust. Here, emphasis should be placed on the possible 
sources of systemic maltreatment. An unjust basic structure or unjust social practices that deny 
the equal status of persons have a deleterious effect on the self and are arguably more important 
from the standpoint of justice than itemized cases of injustice and oppression because an unjust 
basic structure amounts to state-sanctioned oppression. Social philosophy has demonstrated with 
conceptual rigor the many ways in which a person’s self-concept, or the self-understanding of a 
social group can be influenced or harmed by prejudicial maltreatment by the basic structure and 
the collective practices of society19. Thus, Rawls posits a theory of justice aimed at respecting 
individual autonomy which simultaneously addresses the social nature of selfhood by regulating 
the basic structure. As I now demonstrate, this is a first step towards, rather than a full-stop 
inclusion of, important elements of social circumstance into a theory of selfhood. 
4 
LIVED EXPERIENCE  
Lived experience of different forms of oppression and restrictions on one’s liberties can, and 
should, be incorporated into philosophies of the self as they pertain to broader theories of justice. 
Not only can this retrieve Rawlsian liberalism as presented in A Theory of Justice from the 
longstanding critique that its understanding of individual autonomy, but it also relieves some of 
 




the tension regarding the criticism at hand that Rawlsian liberalism is both radically atomistic 
and racialized.  
Taking stock of what has been demonstrated is beneficial at this point. First, it is not the 
case that in Theory, Rawls creates a racialized social contract among persons who are absolutely 
free and detached from their social context20. The critique that, owing to his Kantian foundation, 
Rawls’ work reifies the status of the atomistic and radically free individual in his theory of 
justice is mistaken since, as previously established, Rawls recognizes how the basic structure and 
its influences work to constrain the individual in a variety of ways. Second, even if it is granted 
that those who sympathize with the communitarian objection to Rawlsian liberalism did refute 
Rawls on his own terms, Taylor’s alternative view is inadequate. Although a social matrix 
supports the development of human agency and important cognitive capacities, theories of 
justice must nevertheless and accordingly change their concepts of selfhood to compliment this 
social thesis. More than a priority problem between the communal and the individual, an analysis 
of how we are social beings within a broader theory of justice must also be offered.  
Although Rawls suggests that the deliberators in the original position come from a 
system of social practices that have already been in place and a basic structure that is already 
underway, he does not consider how an experience of the basic structure, as either just or unjust, 
can create different selves that are privileged or oppressed in any number of interacting ways and 
offers no analysis as to how this influences cognition and basic interests. I take this as a crucial 
motivation for Rawls’ talk of the circumstances of justice and his descriptions of the knowledge 
available to party members. It would be unreasonable to think that a presocial, ahistorical being 
could somehow have knowledge of the various possible stages of development their society 
 




might be in as they deliberate from behind the “veil of ignorance”. Additionally, one of the 
reasons for Rawls’ overall theory was certainly pragmatic: to perfect the justness of existing 
societies by following his normative doctrine in Theory. 
The creation of different perspectives, or epistemic locations, as a result of a history of 
the basic structure is precisely the reason for modifying Rawls’ conception of selfhood in this 
thesis. The locus of social mediation was shown to be the basic structure and social practices of a 
society. But this must somehow translate into Rawls’ original position for there to be more than a 
superfluous clarification of Rawls’ overall view. Demonstrating how people’s basic interests can 
be modified by lived experience thus offers a way to expand Rawls’ theory of justice to more 
adequately address concerns of racial and gender oppression as well as consider non-ideal 
circumstances more generally.  
In this section, I first clarify what I mean by “lived experience” and give some 
background as to how it is altogether excluded in Rawls. Then, drawing from Christman, I 
establish how lived experience can be incorporated into a theory of selfhood thus concluding 
with an account of selves as sociohistorical which can serve as the basis for a neo-Rawlsian 
social contract theory. In the last section, I defend the view of selves as sociohistorical from the 
valid yet unsuccessful potential modifications to Rawls’ work proposed by Taylor, Mills, and 
Christman. Finally, I will conclude that not only does the view fare better than proposals offered 
by some philosophers to save key liberal concepts but since those proposals require the 
abandonment of Rawls, I show how the view offered is compatible with Rawls.  
By lived experience, I mean the real-world interplay of events and how an individual 
interacts with these social dynamics, and forces. I don’t mean experience in the strictly empirical 




experience is most notably understood as group or individual interaction with social dynamics 
(economic, racial, or cognitive-affective). An agent can have an experience of oppression, 
privilege, marginalization, social isolation, etc. and interact with their social world in a way that 
can create lasting impressions of varying degrees on their psyche in ways that can modify future 
interaction. Experience is important both on the individual and the social level. Individuals can 
certainly change the way they interact or go about their lives based on a traumatic or positive 
experience of some phenomenon. At the social level as well, groups can share a common 
experience which can, in part, serve to define their collective identity as a social group.  
While this thesis has argued that Rawls endorses an indirectly social conception of 
selfhood, demonstrating the necessity of an explicit recognition of how selves are social is in 
order so that we may move beyond Rawls. As mentioned in section 1, an often-problematized 
component of Rawls’ theory is his use of ideal theory. Representatives of parties in Rawls’ 
original position are a theoretical construction and thus are abstracted from all the particularities 
that distinguish selves in the reality. However, abstraction to an ideal form of theorizing is 
beneficial only in certain contexts. In constructing a just society within ideal theory, certain 
variables are barred from complicating things at such an initial stage of theorizing while other 
factors are left for a later stage. A parallel in the empirical sciences is the physicist who ignores 
friction, later deciding to reintroduce the variable when appropriate. Crucially, the physicist does 
so at their convenience21. When idealizing, a priority relation is generated; as the variables 
controlled for would otherwise complicate things, it makes sense to bracket complexities as 
needed. This priority relation is rather explicit in Rawls as he justifies his use of ideal theory:  
 




The reason for beginning with ideal theory is that it provides, I believe, the only basis for the systematic 
grasp of these more pressing problems. The discussion of civil disobedience, for example, depends upon it 
(§§55–59). At least, I shall assume that a deeper understanding can be gained in no other way, and that the 
nature and aims of a perfectly just society is the fundamental part of the theory of justice. (2009, p. 8) 
The original position is an exemplary case in which Rawls utilizes ideal theory. Representatives 
of parties who come to deliberate in the original position argue impartially since certain facts are 
hidden from them by a “veil of ignorance” (§24). The veil is necessitated because, “somehow we 
must nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to 
exploit social and natural circumstances to their advantage” (p. 118). What remains unobscured 
by the veil of ignorance is the information relevant to establishing a just social framework. He 
defends the use of the veil since it brings the notion of equality to a higher level of abstraction 
and restricts the egoism of the party members resulting in a “fair” scenario of choice,  
This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of 
natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able 
to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair 
agreement or bargain. (2009, p. 11).  
Later as he defends “pure procedural justice”, Rawls offers a different justification for the 
exclusion of elements of selfhood.  
Now the practical advantage of pure procedural justice is that it is no longer necessary to keep track of the 
endless variety of circumstances and the changing relative positions of particular persons. One avoids the 
problem of defining principles to cope with the enormous complexities which would arise if such details 
were relevant. It is a mistake to focus attention on the varying relative positions of individuals and to 
require that every change, considered as a single transaction viewed in isolation, be in itself just. It is the 
arrangement of the basic structure which is to be judged, and judged from a general point of view. Unless 
we are prepared to criticize it from the standpoint of a relevant representative man in some particular 




The theoretical use of the relevant representative man is contrasted with a conception of 
“allocative” justice where goods are “divided among definite individuals with known desires and 
needs” (Ibid p. 76). Procedural justice is conducted at a level of abstraction where it is feasible 
for theorists to account for a range of factors which influence transactions of goods (the desires, 
needs, circumstances, social positions of those involved). A theory of allocative justice, on the 
other hand, would require theorists to know each and every one of these elements (know the 
relative positions of those involved; their desires; their needs, etc.) in order to determine how 
they influence past distributions of goods, correcting for injustices as they present themselves – 
an infeasible task for any theorist. Only after an allocative conception is “suitably generalized”, 
is it then a feasible theory of justice. Even in a generalized (=abstracted from social 
circumstance) form, the allocative conception leads to “the classical utilitarian view” (Ibid). For 
Rawls, this itself is reason enough for the rejection of allocative conceptions.  
By extension, what gets sifted out by the veil of ignorance is considered by Rawls 
irrelevant from the standpoint of justice. The critical purpose representative persons collectively 
serve is to model how fully rational and reasonable agents would come together and decide on 
principles of justice. In this “initial situation of choice” all contingencies like a person’s 
socioeconomic class, race, gender, religious belief, etc. are said to bias the decision-making 
process. Rawls believes knowledge of one’s own contingencies promotes acting self-interestedly, 
or reifies existing social hierarchies, which both serve to bias the deliberation process. Thus, with 
the use of veil of ignorance, the thought is that these representative citizens have had their 
rationality and their reasonableness isolated from contingencies which otherwise cloud reason.  
The analogy to the physicist is a close one in the case of a philosopher dealing with social 




longer dealing with friction or ubiquitous forces that can so easily be ignored for the sake of 
simplicity since dynamics of power are so fundamental to the development of the self. As 
feminists and critical race theorists have demonstrated, the question of whether there are 
components of selfhood which can reasonably be “set aside” when theorizing requires a more 
nuanced answer than the affirmative response which mainstream political philosophers have 
offered for decades. To give an example, the historic focus on rationality is problematized since 
it has meant the denigration of affective capacities important in situations of caregiving22. Thus, 
however benign claims concerning the veil of ignorance might seem, to continually focus on 
capacities like rationality or to bracket questions of the influence of race, ethnicity, gender, 
sexuality and class position all have on selfhood in certain contexts is not an innocent pragmatic 
move, it is instead an avoidance which carries normative weight. 
The importance of ideal theory is crystallized by Rawls’ arguments for the original 
position as a mechanism which allows for the objectivity of moral judgments that theorists would 
otherwise lack. However, its pitfalls have previously been demonstrated in its apparent 
insensitivity to matters of race and the myopic focus on the individual which characterizes many 
who engage in this method. I believe there is a way to retain the benefits of ideal theory without 
completely bracketing questions of real-world concern. Contrary to what Rawls suggests, we 
need not embrace an allocative conception of desert to do so. We need only relax the 
requirements for a theory to be “sufficiently general” so that theorists can continue normative 
philosophical work at the level of ideal theory while making important departures from the 
framework set out by Rawls. Thus, I offer a middle ground between having a full picture of a 
person's contextualized desires and environments (allocative justice) and completely abstracting 
 




from these particularities (procedural justice). The proposal is to import a sociohistorical view of 
selves into the original position. 
5 
SOCIOHISTORICAL SELFHOOD 
Among the descriptions of selfhood Rawls offers, both in Kantian Constructivism and in his 
discussion of the indirect ways in which selves are social in A Theory of Justice, it should be 
added that selves are sociohistorical and embodied. I rely on Christman (2009) for the respective 
definitions and expound his view shortly. This proposal can be brought to a higher level of 
generality so as to figure into the original position along with the other knowledge available to 
the representative persons. No particular sociohistorical construction or embodied experience 
(hereafter: lived experience) will itself enter the original position. However, the basic premise 
that selves are sociohistorical and all that thesis entails is sufficiently general and will positively 
affect the outcome of the original position by making it sensitive to past power imbalances and 
thus some of the critiques of Rawls from “non-ideal” philosophy. 
The analysis Christman offers throughout is to examine how “‘selves’ can be said to be 
constituted by relations external to the individual person”23. Christman argues that the thesis that 
selves are social can be framed in three different areas of theory: as a metaphysical thesis, a 
psychological thesis, and one about values and motivations at the political level. He does not, 
however, uncritically support all social theses of selves. Rather, he attempts to answer whether 
“any plausible versions of that claim” could “rule out or complicate those individualized 
conceptions of autonomy that require critical self-reflection” (2009 p.22). Ultimately, despite 
what Christman suggests, all three domains (metaphysical, psychological, political) are 
 




interwoven and a society which expects citizens to cooperate with the chosen principles of 
justice will make claims about selves at each level24. Rawls’ extended discussion of rational 
plans of life is one example of a theory which makes claims on each level (metaphysical, 
psychological, political) as persons are expected to be able to adjudicate between their goals and 
associations that are worth pursuing as well as the claim that this faculty is a key aspect of 
rationality which (conceptually) influences the ultimate selection of the principles of justice. 
Admittedly, the ways selves are socially constructed are loose and hard to define with the 
precision that characterizes traditional analytic philosophy. However, an enumeration of different 
examples of the possible ways which selves are in part the product of social and historical factors 
that are external to the individual can lead to a better understanding of the view I am advocating. 
In this way, I rely on the immense literature in the intersecting and interdependent traditions of 
communitarian, feminist, critical philosophy and critical philosophy of race which demonstrate 
the myriad ways in which selves are a product of their context25. There should be no controversy 
in accepting that selves are in part dialogical and subject to change over time (a metaphysical 
claim), are cognitive-affectively influenced by their social location, culture, and language 
(psychological), and that their values and motivations are influenced by the sociocultural and 
sociohistorical context in which they are located (political). If classical individualism is 
abandoned, then this theoretical departure must also come with simultaneous support of a 
positive account of selfhood as sociohistorical. 
 
24 Contrary to Rawlsian assertions that his theory of selfhood in Political Liberalism is “free-standing”. 
25 In no particular order, a few important examples include: Taylor (1992) for social sources of the “modern 
identity”, Bettcher (2014) for an investigation of socially mediated trans identity, Alcoff (2017) for how sexual 
violence alters the self, Crenshaw (1993) for an intersectional approach to selfhood, Lugones (1992) for a world-




It is astonishingly difficult to do justice to all the ways in which selves are socially 
constructed. I suspect this is a motivating reason for Rawls’ exclusion of these considerations, as 
their implementation into a theory of justice is either impossible or biasing at best. But given 
Rawls’ use of procedural justice, the content of social construction need not be specified. Only 
the possibility of social construction needs to be enumerated by a theory of justice. Rather than 
presuppose an individualistic conception of autonomy as the basis of personhood, the thesis that 
selves are socially constructed should take center stage in one’s theory rather than require an 
analysis of the indirect ways in which selves are social (as argued in the latter half of section 3).  
Any proposed change to Rawlsian liberalism which aims at the inclusion of elements of 
social experience ought to meet three criteria. In order to maintain ideal theorizing as a legitimate 
metaphilosophy, the first criterion is that the proposed modification to the Rawlsian framework 
allows ideal theory in some capacity. The second criterion is a congruence requirement with the 
Rawlsian system; the change must be acceptable in the original position. We must guard against 
the possibility that the party members in the original position are either unaware of the social 
selfhood thesis one advocates for due to the veil of ignorance or they do not see it as a valid 
reason to support the proposed principles of justice which manifest the proposed alteration. 
Leading to the final criterion, there must be a noticeable change in the principles of justice 
chosen in the original position. Put simply, if the goal is to ensure a different output of the 
original position, the input must change accordingly. This new input must be distinguishable 
from the description of the original position Rawls offers. If not, then if the goal was to make 
Rawlsian liberalism sensitive to social and historical circumstance, there is no reason to believe 
that the proposal was worthwhile as the party members will still select the same principles of 




these criteria are ordered by priority. If a theory fails the first criteria then, since the second 
depends on the first and the third depends on the second, by extension it fails all of the criteria. 
In this light, I evaluate Mills’ claim of the domination contract, Taylor’s social thesis, and 
Christman’s proposed circumstance of justice. As each is ultimately unsatisfactory, I 
demonstrate how the sociohistorical view of selves I have argued for passes all three criteria. 
Beginning with Mills, he fails the first criteria. His novel proposal is that philosophers 
abandon ideal theorizing altogether and instead embrace a realist and descriptive metaphilosophy 
that makes central the history of white domination. His thesis that liberalism has in fact been 
racialized because of its blindness to these features of reality comes with the ameliorative 
proposal that we instead adopt a domination contract and a “dark ontology”26 in order to owe up 
to liberalism’s racist past. The central dogma behind his claims, however, is that philosophers 
must abandon ideal theorizing and instead take up “non-ideal” philosophy through some form of 
historical materialism or another realist metaphilosophy. As stated previously (§2), ideal 
theorizing is a necessary component for the construction of normative political and moral 
philosophy. This is not to say that the non-ideal is inessential or should not in any way figure 
into the ideal. However, completely renouncing ideal theorizing is unproductive and should be 
avoided. For these reasons, Mills’ proposal for retrieving Rawls for a critical philosophy of race 
fails by the first criterion established. His general criticism about mainstream political 
philosophy’s silence on matters of race is nevertheless a valid concern whose spirit I wish to 
maintain. This claim is however separable from Mills’ proposals and in fact motivates my view. 
Charles Taylor passes the first criterion, as nowhere does his philosophical methodology 
suggest that he has abandoned ideal theorizing. Yet Taylor nevertheless fails by the second 
 




criterion (acceptability in the OP). His novel proposal for the amelioration of classical 
individualism is to incorporate a “thesis of belonging” (1977) which is intended to secure a place 
within society, and its diverse array of social practices, for the self. Generally, Taylor believes 
theses of belonging and theses of rights are in a priority battle and a result of toxic western 
individualism is that theses of rights have won (1985). However, following the Taylorian logic, 
this means something like having a principle of justice about belonging that is lexically prior to 
one about rights (e.g. Rawls’ first principle of justice). 
This proposal would not be accepted in the original position for three main reasons. First, 
party members are mutually self-interested and as a result would choose principles guaranteeing 
rights above those guaranteeing social positions. Second, as has been argued at length in this 
thesis, since the basic structure is the subject of justice, persons are not radically free. Taylor’s 
argument of the existence of a priority battle between the two “conflicting” theses is predicated 
on the belief that party members in the original position are radically free and choose principles 
concerning rights at the expense of social theses. Since the social basis of self respect is the 
fundamental good and party members come into the original position from an ongoing society 
with communal practices and attachments, there would be no reason for party members to then 
prioritize a place in society for themselves since they were never asocial or apolitical beings to 
begin with. And finally, even if the party members were to select a thesis of belonging, it would 
have to be implemented by some entity larger than, though not entirely separate from, the 
Rawlsian subject of justice i.e. a society’s public institutions and practices. Ensuring that people 
have a place within a larger political and social system is a task for an amalgamation of entities 
and forces that goes far beyond the power available to the public institutions and practices of a 




basic structure, the burden on public institutions to enforce social belonging would be too great a 
task so as to make its achievement impossible and therefore undesirable as a component in a 
principle of justice chosen from within the original position. 
Finally, John Christman proposes an additional circumstance of justice alongside Rawls’ 
existing list. The circumstance of justice he adds is intended to make explicit the historic power 
differentials which have characterized the West. His proposal is “that we add to the 
circumstances of justice the presence of measurable inequality of social power, the systematic 
exposure to unique forms of violence, and a pattern of past domination affecting identifiable 
groups in the society, conditions that all would be labeled as unjust by any plausible principles” 
(2009 p. 224). Justifying this addition, he adds that “these and other aspects of the non-ideal 
circumstances of justice […] will affect standards of justice and legitimacy by putting pressure 
on institutions to allow citizens to gain redress from their disadvantaged position in the 
democratic procedures that establish and maintain that legitimacy” (2009 p. 224). So, not only 
does Christman believe that the principles of justice would be affected, but the addition to the 
circumstances of justice would figure into the decisions made by the members in the original 
position. Moreover, he reaches this conclusion after accepting that an ideal theory of justice is to 
be preferred despite surveying arguments to the contrary from Mills. 
However, Christman misunderstands the motivations of the party members as Rawls 
describes them. Rawls states that the party members are not bound in their decisions by previous 
moral ties held to one another and the brief discussion of how the principles of justice will obtain 
for generations to come, he reveals that party members are only (morally) concerned with future 
generations (p. 111). Meaning, they choose principles that would be acceptable to hold future 




since party members have severed current or past moral ties upon entering the original position 
and all moral ties between other non-contractors are forward-looking, it wouldn’t affect their 
decision-making to add to an objective circumstance of justice like the one Christman proposes. 
Even if, like moderate scarcity, the power differentials Christman describes could be conceived 
of in a value-neutral sense so as not to presuppose a theory of justice for their categorization as 
unjust oppressive circumstance, party members would not feel compelled to act on the behalf of 
previous generations (social groups, or individuals) since due to their location within the original 
position party members are abstracted away from any existent moral ties (past or present) to 
those non-contracting parties. 
Thus, Christman fails to meet the second criterion as the party members would not be 
motivated to select principles of justice which would allow citizens to gain redress for historical 
power differentials precisely because the members in the original position as Rawls describes 
them are not concerned with corrective justice. Despite Christman’s belief to the contrary, there 
would thus be no change made to the Rawlsian principles of justice. I suggest the reason that 
Christman fails is because his analysis does not extend the thesis of sociohistorical selfhood to 
Rawls. The reason the additional circumstance of justice would be ineffectual in changing the 
principles of justice is because the motivations party members have when adjudicating between 
various principles remains the same as a result of Rawls’ view of selfhood. Therefore, to include 
valid components of non-ideal circumstance, there must be an analogous change to the Rawlsian 
self. Supplant the classically individualist Kantian selfhood with one whose identity is in part a 
product of its social context and circumstance. Demonstrating how this is possible within a 





LIVED EXPERIENCE IN THE ORIGINAL POSITION 
The traditional dialectic between communitarian and liberal philosophers concerning the 
self has been locked in a binary of opposition and offers little guidance towards a workable 
conception of selfhood. Taylor’s analysis, while crucial for re-examining the assumptions of a 
strictly individualistic liberal self, simultaneously forwards the equally questionable thesis of 
social determinism. In effect the social matrix which Taylor so strongly argues goes 
unrecognized by the liberal, is on the other hand, set as the immutable background to human 
agency. Liberal responders like Kymlica forward the opposite claim that all commitments, 
whether they be social, political, or religious are subject to possible revision by the liberal self. 
As some have pointed out, this seems to devalue certain commitments if they are in themselves 
always a possible subject of revision. The binary thus reveals itself to be between complete 
social determinism and absolute freedom. I argue that since both extremes are equally 
unsatisfying, a self which is sensitive to some level of social determinacy by way of appeals to 
its sociohistorical construction and the embodied dimension of human life are all compatible 
with a broadly Rawlsian framework. This section aims at the application of the view of 
sociohistorical selfhood to a broadly Rawlsian account of justice and argues that this is 
preferable to Rawls’ own view of selfhood presented in Theory as it better represents people’s 
basic interests.  
To begin, Christman opens his book (2009) by making the claim that all theories of the 
self as the subject of political theory must represent selves as sociohistorical. He argues 
normative political principles ought to focus on a general and universal autonomy, but one that 
eludes the sexist and individualistic normative implications which have characterized traditional 




deconstructive critical theorists have argued.27 Autonomy and a theory of social selfhood are of 
particular importance to any political theory which aims at the construction of principles of 
justice, but Christman is not committed to any one theory in particular. Rather, Christman 
admonishes political theorists concerned with principles of justice to first accept this social 
theory of selfhood.  
The scope of Christman’s argument is rather large, as he addresses any theory which 
aims at justifying certain principles of justice. I argue that Christman’s theory of selfhood goes 
too far to specify a particular kind of self-understanding as the model28. As such, it is not the case 
that one must accept Christman’s overall view of selfhood. In order for lived experience to be 
enumerated as a general fact of selfhood available to the party members in the original position, 
we need only accept a suitably generalized formulation of Christman’s thesis and not his overall 
metaphysics of personhood. The following demonstrates how this is so.  
Firstly, Theory can accept that selfhood is in part sociohistorical since the principles of 
justice apply to a basic structure and social practices that are already underway. In this sense, the 
Rawlsian self, prior to entrance into the original position, is already affected by a history of 
experience with the basic structure. It may well be that some had no pragmatic reasons to make 
claims of injustice against components of the basic structure due to a general lack of negative 
experience with its institutions. Nevertheless, that experience of relative privilege is a way in 
which the self has been socially constituted. Conversely, not only is an experience of systemic 
injustice on the part of public institutions or social practices a genuine basis to make claims 
 
27 For a general attack on liberal selfhood as inherently exclusionary see Falguni Sheth (2009) or Mills (1998). For 
attacks on selfhood in general, see Judith Butler (1990) for a deconstruction of identity, or Foucault (1984) for a 
deconstruction of selfhood. 
28 Particularly in his descriptions of the “self as narrative” account in which he emphasizes the role memory plays in 




against the basic structure but it likewise results in a cognitive-affective change in the citizen’s 
being, it is only more pronounced in the latter case since this is a deviation from the normalcy of 
relative privilege. The lack of change on the part of the person who experiences relative privilege 
should not, however, be considered the norm as this experience itself impacts the beliefs and 
desires of those who possess it. In both instances, there exists a direct sociohistorical influence at 
some level (group or individual) on selfhood.  
Thus, Rawls’ philosophical anthropology presented in Theory must be modified to 
countenance this fact since it ought to be represented to party members in the original position. 
At present, these considerations are grouped and labeled as but one of the many ways in which 
rationality can be clouded. Therefore, a strict Rawlsian might be hesitant to allow such facts past 
the veil of ignorance. But if party members know that the principles of justice are to apply to the 
basic structure, by inference they should understand that persons are greatly impacted by the 
institutions and practices which the basic structure defines. I suggest that from this previous 
point just mentioned, the rationality of the party members thus requires that they recognize 
selves are socially constituted in the above sense (§5). They should be able to understand how 
sociohistorical attachments to the self can manipulate basic interests. To guard these interests and 
their enjoyment in a just society, the sociohistorical nature of persons must be taken into 
consideration by the party members. This should not preclude the fact that particular 
sociohistorical attachments are to be hidden behind the veil.  
Secondly, the view of selfhood I advocate requires an embodied dimension. This too can 
be a fact of personhood which party members keep in mind as they deliberate about the 
principles of justice. Similar to the case of knowledge of sociohistorical constitution, party 




which they are socially marked. Race, gender, and class are in part social constructs, but they are 
nevertheless salient ways in which society has been stratified or as ways to mark heterodoxy. 
Thus, norms and tropes built around these identities in part determine what opportunities are 
available as well as influence the cognitive-affective states of persons. These influences are to be 
considered in the original position and principles which guard against the perpetuation of these 
unjustified but existent differentials of privilege and power are to be preferred over principles 
that do not.  
Although we might easily think of examples of interpersonal interactions resulting in 
maltreatment of an individual, the focus here is on an experience of oppression by the basic 
structure. What is of interest is experience of systematic oppression carried out by public 
institutions or social practices and norms. Discussions of systemic racial, gender, or class-based 
oppression thus come to the fore. This is maltreatment not in the way commonly understood by 
moral philosophy where one clearly and intentionally classist, racist, or sexist individual 
commits a moral wrong against another. Iris Marion Young in her 1990 article describes 
systemic oppression well as she makes an effort to move from the standard definition of 
“oppression”, what Foucault terms a “dyadic relation of ruler and subject” (Foucault 1977), to a 
broader view, what Marilyn Frye describes as “an enclosing structure of forces and barriers 
which tends to the immobilization and reduction of a group or category of people” (Frye 1983).  
Though not fully represented in certain academic circles, there exists a long history of 
intellectual and critical thought expressed through nonacademic avenues. Themes of systematic 
oppression arise in African American spirituals in the antebellum South, blues, jazz, spoken 
word poetry, rap and visual art. Though this is an incomplete and overlapping list, it is intended 




cultural spectrum in the United States. Social philosophers, as well as the non-academic 
movements mentioned avoce, have chronicled the ways in which systemic injustices change the 
psychology of persons located within these groups29. Additionally, knowledge of systemic 
oppression can be extrapolated to the social level. Mills argues that via social cognition, 
professional and non-professional intellectual movements can pass this knowledge down to 
future generations. It is because experiences of oppression as well as privilege, both past and 
present, make us who we are as members of social groups and as individuals, that any adequate 
principle of justice must be constructed with an eye towards this sociohistorical aspect of 
selfhood.  
Christman notes the importance of modeling persons this way within a theory of justice. 
“The interests of persons modeled in these procedures (for deriving principles) will not be 
adequately specified when the circumstances of justice assume away their experience of past and 
ongoing oppression.” A model of personhood including sociohistorical and embodied elements 
enables a theory’s “sensitivity to how things have gone so far, indeed how such projects are 
understood as part of an already structured” self (p. 223).  
Now it is important to specify that a historical element of selfhood, as Christman 
recognizes, does not come “value-laden” with a theory of justice as it may seem circular for talk 
of oppression to serve as a concept employed in the construction of a theory of justice (Ibid). I 
agree with Christman that an analysis of social power avoids this problem since “when persons 
or groups are systematically better able to pursue their favored projects, shape social institutions, 
generate social policy, and so on, they can be said to have greater social power, and saying this 
does not depend on our understanding of what ‘justice’ means.” Historical bookkeeping of who 
 
29 See e.g. W.E.B. Dubois on blacks’ second sight in Souls p. 5; George Yancy in Look, a White; or, José Medina in 




has power in a given society need not come with additional value judgments about whether or 
not they gained power legitimately, whether they ought to keep that power, etc. Thus, gauging 
social power does not rely on a theory of justice which demarcates where that power ought to lie. 
The same can be said of the “stipulation of ongoing domination” via “differential power, 
exclusion from generally favored social positions, and intentional and/or passive denial of equal 
social and political status to these groups” (Ibid.). These stipulations merely document existent 
power differentials and social preferences rather than rely on a formal definition of justice. As 
such, they may be included in a theory of justice without the charge of circularity and thus many 
“non-ideal” considerations which have altogether historically been idealized away can be 
included within a neo-Rawlsian theory of justice.  
Specifying the historical nature of selfhood requires that we also move past the dyadic 
understanding of oppression as between an oppressor and a subjugated. Rawls argues that 
individuals have no claim against the basic structure based on token actions of injustice or unjust 
distribution of goods in itemized cases. This, however, narrows the scope of injustice to itemized 
harmful actions. Thus, adopting a broader understanding of moral injury and oppression requires 
that we take up the additional sociohistorical aspect of personhood where harms can be drawn 
out over a period of time across an individual’s life (microaggressions) or generationally passed 
down through history into the present (systemic oppression). After understanding that the basic 
structure influences the self in a myriad number of ways, the ontological expansion of 
personhood is the next logical step in constructing a neo-Rawlsian account. This is a modest 
extension rather than a radical do-over of Rawls’ own account.  
Two alternatives for addressing matters of systemic oppression via a Rawlsian lens are 




circumstances of justice the presence of measurable inequality of social power, the systematic 
exposure to unique forms of violence, and a pattern of past domination affecting identifiable 
groups in the society, conditions that all would be labeled as unjust by any plausible principles” 
with the key stipulation added in a footnote that this claim is only “that such uncontroversially 
unjust conditions prevailed” and continue into the present. These conditions include 
“discrimination, racialized and sexualized violence, attempts at extermination directed towards 
indigenous populations, and related phenomena” (2009, p. 224). While a circumstance of justice 
which specifically enumerates these conditions is important for historical accuracy, I believe that 
the way persons are modeled in the original position does better to reconcile histories of 
oppression. Insofar as these conditions are related to an epistemological claim about the 
pervasive effects they bear on cognition (on a person’s beliefs and desires, etc.) this must 
translate into the facts of psychology that party members know from behind the veil of 
ignorance. While their particular position within those social and economic power differentials is 
still obscured, the bare knowledge that past injustices contribute to the construction of selfhood 
should remain available to deliberators as they choose the principles of justice.  
This remodeling of persons in the “initial stage” of Rawls’ theory is necessary to guard 
against the possibility that there be no real change in the outcome of the original position. As the 
staunch Rawlsian would point out, even if we assume that the basic structure and practices were 
historically unjust, since the principles of justice regulate the basic structure there is no 
pragmatic reason to include Christman’s stipulation. Put simply, if the new circumstance of 
justice doesn’t change how we bring about a just society, compared to Rawls’ original principles 
of justice, then why include it at all? The remodeling of persons addresses this concern since it 




The second alternative is presented by Mills. Generally, he argues that a theory of justice 
must make concessions to the real-world existence of systemic oppression and subjugation by 
only engaging in non-ideal theory. Only by an explicit recognition of the history of, in the case of 
race, white domination will a theory of justice be realistic in its expectations given that the 
modern era was so defined by racial domination. Make clear that the social contract is racial and 
that the concepts of personhood are racialized and only then can a racially stratified society like 
our own ascend to the, albeit down to earth, expectations of non-ideal corrective justice. 
Christman does well to summarize this point when he says:  
[t]he critique waged by Mills concerning ideal theory can be applied here in different form, namely that 
when principles are derived that assume rough equality of social and other forms of power and are applied 
to conditions of systematic dissimilarity along those dimensions, they can have the distorting effect I 
alluded to earlier. That is, past and ongoing victimization and domination of some groups by others may 
well be exacerbated when the facts of that domination are ignored. (Ibid, p. 222) 
Further, for patterns of victimization or domination to be described as such requires the usage of 
“value-landen” terminology as these patterns depend on a theory of justice to be categorized as 
such. Many of Mills’ descriptions of non-ideal circumstances rely on an analysis of domination 
as a moral wrong or as a phenomenon to be corrected by justice. So, Mills is unable to escape the 
need for a normative account of justice in his non-ideal theoretical approach. Furthermore, a 
social contract which aims to rectify these patterns of injustice from an accurate “factual picture” 
of reality misunderstands the contract as a corrective justice document.  
Mills ignores the fact that a non-ideal theory, to provide normative guidance, requires a 
supplemental ideal theory. This can come in the form of counterfactual scenarios which begin 




metaphilosophy Rawls supports. Either way, it can be done without reifying ideology30, that is, 
without masking inequality and mistaking equality as a defining feature of political reality. 
Correspondingly, to offer the critique that the ideal theoretical approach necessarily reifies 
inequalities requires a theory of justice to characterize them (unjust distributions of material 
resources, inequities in gender and racial dynamics, etc.) as such. Therefore, because the social 
contract is not racial; and the concepts of personhood are not radically atomistic nor racialized. 
Although many of these critiques did not accurately represent Rawls to begin with, a defense of 
the self as social has been offered so as to explicitly take “non-ideal” considerations into mind. 
As such, a wholesale rejection of Rawls’ method is an excessive solution to the alleged problem. 
The clarificatory sections of this thesis help further defend against the criticism that the Rawlsian 
theory of justice is committed to atomism and racial liberalism. Quite the opposite is true of his 

















30 In the classical Marxist understanding of the term, that ideologies function to distort or hide the actual unequal 
material conditions which characterize political reality. Mills’ (2005) ideological critique of ideal theory is that ideal 
theorists, by practicing this abstracting metaphilosophy, lose sight of real inequalities when a view of reality as 
inherently devoid of inequalities is forwarded in place of an undistorted picture of reality which makes those 
inequalities central. However, I find Žižek’s (1989) analysis that ideology is both unconscious and inescapable a 
debilitating critique of arguments like these since their crux lies in positing the existence of an undistorted axiology 
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